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PAYING FOR CHILDREN'S
MEDICAL CARE:
INTERACTION BETWEEN
FAMILY LAW AND COST
CONTAINMENT
Walter J. Wadlington*
Health care cost containment has much support as a general proposition. How-
ever, it may have significant deleterious effects on the medical care afforded our chil-
dren. This Article analyzes family law issues relating to the medical care of children
in light of current health care cost restraints. Professor Wadlington discusses judicial
and statutory parental duties to provide for children's health care, as well as termina-
tion thereof children's own financial responsibility for health care, and the impact of
the tort system on children's health care costs. He concludes with some observations
concerning family law as it might interact with medical cost restraints and suggests
avenues which need to be explored.
INTRODUCTION
IN ADDITION TO the difficulties that new cost-containment
measures will present for health care institutions and practices
generally, our system for delivering medical care to children may
face special problems that we are only beginning to recognize.
Choices about resource allocation may be limited by political and
legal restraints largely beyond the control of planners trying to fo-
cus on the most effective distribution of health care dollars. Much
of our limited system of state financial contribution to children's
medical care is tied to a public assistance program which also faces
cost-reduction pressures. In the current political climate, increased
emphasis is being placed on enforcing private child support obliga-
tions in order to reduce governmental costs, while at the same time
there is increased conflict over the respective roles of parents and
state in deciding what constitutes appropriate or required medical
care for children.
* James Madison Professor of Law and Professor of Legal Medicine, University of
Virginia. A.B., Duke University (1951); LL. B., Tulane University School of Law (1954).
The author wishes to thank Michael Dean, Louis Haskell and Michele Masucci for their
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This Article is the result of an exploration of possible ways in
which family law and legal rules regarding children and their rights
may interact with cost-containment measures directed toward chil-
dren's health care. Among the pertinent issues are how such inter-
action might limit workable alternatives by producing unwanted
results, such as family destabilization, and possible ways which the
interaction might help promote better health care for children.
Some findings do little more than confirm the bleakness of the cur-
rent picture; others seem to suggest a need to alter our approach if
we are to provide adequate health care for children in accordance
with widely-held societal values in a time of diminishing resources.
I. SOME DISTINCTIVE PROBLEMS AND NEEDS:
AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT
Although assertions that children have a basic "right" to ade-
quate health care are not uncommon, such statements at this time
are best categorized as exercises in political rhetoric.' It is ironic
that despite long and vocal public affirmation of overriding interest
in the protection and nurture of children, the United States is virtu-
ally the only industrialized nation with no family allowance pro-
grams.2 Some consider it anomalous that Medicare, our first major
venture into a broad national health care system, focused not on
young children but on the elderly. In recent years, the latter group
has increased in size while the former has decreased. Because the
elderly are especially likely to require highly cost-intensive services,
attempts to institute a broad social insurance scheme for children
may thus be all the more difficult.4
Although many children today receive medical assistance
through government programs such as Medicaid or Supplemental
1. This statement is not meant to indicate that a right to basic health care for children
should not be our goal.
2. Family allowances may be described as regular cash payments to families with chil-
dren. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, RESEARCH REPORT No. 59, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGH-
OUT THE WORLD 1983 xxv (1984).
3. The number of persons 65 years and over in the United States increased from
22,696,000 in 1976 to 26,824,000 in 1982. The number of persons below age 18 decreased
from 67,165,000 to 62,765,000 during the same period. The percentage of persons over age
65 increased from 10.5 to 11.6 percent of the population, while persons 17 or younger de-
creased from 31.2 to 27.1 percent. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 34
(10th ed. 1984). Population projections suggest continuation of this trend to the year 2000.
Id. at 32.
4. Another obstacle, of course, is our traditional approach to financing social insurance
schemes by basing eligibility on participation in the work force.
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Security Income (SSI), those programs focus on population groups
with the greatest financial need-persons eligible for public assist-
ance under a program such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) or close enough to that eligibility line to be
deemed "medically needy." Further, these public assistance pro-
grams are already under attack from many quarters, and the serv-
ices they provide vary from one state to another. Other categorical
assistance programs and various private philanthropic efforts may
aid some children who have specific medical needs, but such a frag-
mented system can hardly be regarded as the embodiment of a
"right" to medical care.'
Budgetary constraints are not new to those involved in trying to
expand children's health care.6 Financial cuts hamper existing pro-
grams and preclude the development of new ones, moving us far-
ther from the goal of assuring health care to children on the basis of
medical need regardless of family economic status. Nevertheless,
barring major changes in political priorities, it seems unrealistic to
expect significant expansion of government funding in the near fu-
ture. In fact, some existing Medicaid coverage may be in jeopardy.
Under most predictable scenarios, private insurance and family
contributions are likely to be of increasing importance. Each of
these sources, however, has built-in limitations on its effectiveness
in a time of cost cutting, since many families with young children
stand low on the economic ladder.
At a time when private employers seek to pare their health care
insurance contributions (a significant part of employee fringe benefit
packages), their interests might best be served by maintaining
health coverage for their employees while decreasing coverage of
other family members, including children. Even without such an
extreme approach, other measures such as increasing employee de-
ductibles may have a harsh impact on children's medical care.
Although cost sharing by insurance could be structured so as to
minimize or avoid such a result,7 it must be recognized that chil-
dren will not be sitting at contract negotiating tables or in under-
5. See generally Cluff, Chronic Disability of Infants and Children, 38 J. CHRONIC Dis-
EASE 113 (1985); Strauss, The Arms Race and Children in Fiscal Year 1985, 75 PEDIATRICS
1149 (1985).
6. For an excellent review of these cost problems, see Blendon, Payingfor Medical Care
for Children: A Continuing Financial Dilemma, 29 ADVANCES IN PEDIATRICS 229 (1982).
7. For greater discussion of this issue, see Austin, Child Health-Care Financing and
Competition, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1117 (1984); Davidson, Connelly, Blim, Strain & Tay-
lor, Consumer Cost-Sharing as a Means to Reduce Health Care Costs, 65 PEDIATRICS 168
(1980).
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writers' offices when those decisions are made. This concern
highlights a pr blem central to many issues involving children: too
often there is no effective mechanism for raising the concerns and
protecting the interests of children in policy determinations that
will have great impact on them.'
In considering where cuts might be made in children's health
care costs, it is important to recognize that with a few major excep-
tions, such as neonatal intensive care, pediatrics has not involved,
until recently, either the commitment to routine use of expensive
technology or the potential for excessive hospitalization that has
characterized the practice of many other specialties. Although
highly regarded in their communities, pediatricians often command
smaller fees than those accorded most other major specialists.
These factors suggest that there may be fewer areas where funding
cuts might be made without immediate, noticeable effects on patient
care.
The economic well-being of many families is vulnerable to even
modest increases in medical costs. With the prospect of new spe-
cialty procedures and greater use of expensive technology, many
families who traditionally have paid for their children's basic medi-
cal care without governmental help are uneasy about potential fi-
nancial exposure. Significant reductions in insurance coverage
could further exacerbate such worries.
II. WEIGHING POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FAMILIES: THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF FAMILY LAW
Recent legal consideration of children's medical care has fo-
cused chiefly on problems of state intervention protecting defective
neonates or seriously ill children whose parents refuse to permit or
provide traditional medical treatment because of personal or reli-
gious views.9 Courts in those cases usually have not explained
what, if any, consideration was given to who should pay for such
8. This problem can extend to judicial decisions as well. Among the most noteworthy
of such examples is Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), a case involving a state's denial of
a fitness hearing to the father of his illegitimate children upon the mother's death. Although
seemingly unintended, the language of the court's decision created havoc in the process of
adoptive placement and its impact still is felt after more than a decade. See also Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (a custody case in which the court seemed more interested in
whether procedural requirements were followed than assuring subjective determination of the
best interests of the child).
9. See, eg., Matter of Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936
(1979); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978); Custody of a Minor
(No. 3), 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
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treatment or care. One might speculate that many were "test" cases
that involved difficult constitutional issues that needed resolution
before cost-allocation problems could be faced. 10 In this judicial
vacuum, courts might have assumed that someone was prepared to
foot the bill, thereby ignoring the cost issue. Perhaps no one gave
serious thought to the relationship between health care policy or
resource allocation and legal rules involving family governance and
children's rights. Whatever the reason, a combination of legal and
practical developments such as increased emphasis on enforcing pri-
vate support obligations supported by stringent enforcement meas-
ures, a broader definition of medical neglect, and intensified
financial pressures from the state make it almost inevitable that fi-
nancial factors will increasingly crop up in legal disputes regarding
medical care for children. Already there have been some cases in-
volving children in state custody with no parents available. In such
instances courts have not been reluctant to find a state duty of sup-
port under doctrines such as parens patriae or in loco parentis. "
In the past there have been significant instances when obvious
legal implications of new developments in medical practice have
been ignored. 12 There may now be sufficient recognition of the need
to consider legal issues as well as ethical, scientific, and economic
factors if we are to succeed in introducing health care reforms that
will function effectively without unduly threatening existing institu-
tions. Legal changes may obviate many such concerns, but there is
a need to anticipate the problems and take the necessary steps in a
timely fashion before crises arise.
A. Defining Parental Duties to Provide Health Care
One might assume that most questions regarding the legal duty
10. Among such pioneering cases dealing with the confrontation between parents and
the state (or the medical establishment) were State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751
(1962) (blood transfusion); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(1952); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), 378 Mass. 732, 393
N.E.2d 836 (1979) (the Chad Green cases); and Matter of Holbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393
N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
11. See, e.g., In re Tanner, 549 P.2d 703 (Utah 1976) (ordering a state's division of
family services to pay for orthodontia needed by a child whose mother was dead and whose
father had disappeared). See also In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972) (court or-
dered removal of tonsils at state expense over father's religious objections).
12. One of the most obvious instances of this has been in cases involving artificial con-
ception. See Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L.
REV. 465 (1983). For a broader commentary on the relationship between law and the health
care system, see Springer, Law and Medicine-Reflections on a Metaphysical Misalliance, in
POLITICS AND LAW IN HEALTH CARE POLICY 201 (J. McKinlay ed. 1973).
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of parents to pay for their children's medical care and the means for
enforcing such an obligation would have been answered long ago.
This, however, is not the case. Worse yet, new questions now are
being raised in a time of changing views about the rights of children
and the role of the state regarding health care decisions for them.
This situation may be analogized to the uncertain scope of an older
child's capacity to consent to medical care, an area of much confu-
sion today."3 More than providing an analogy, the manner in
which we resolve some important issues regarding children's capac-
ity to give, and parental authority to withhold, consent may affect
the determination of who must pay for children's medical care.
Much of our law governing support duties of children has devel-
oped through cases involving parents who were separated or di-
vorced. One explanation for this is that restrictions on intrafamily
legal actions prevented children from suing their parents, and thus
it was in the context of a custodial parent's action against an absent
(perhaps divorced) parent that the issue most often reached the
courts. Exceptions to this tendency are those cases involving par-
ents who refused consent to necessary medical procedures (particu-
larly in the face of life-threatening circumstances), or where
parental failure to provide a minimal level of support jeopardized a
child's welfare to the extent that removal from the home and per-
haps even criminal prosecution were considered to be the appropri-
ate response. Changes in this process may now occur as a result of
modem moves toward abolishing procedural rules that have pre-
vented legal actions by minors against their parents.14
1. Equitable and Statutory Responses to Inadequate Common
Law Remedies
A melange of statutory, equitable and common law approaches
have been used to seek reimbursement from parents of children to
13. For further discussion see A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADO-
LESCENT MEDICINE (2d ed. 1985); Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision Mak-
ing Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976); JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO RIGHTS OF MINORS, PART IV: MEDICAL
CARE (1980); Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk" On State Supervention of Paren-
talAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977); Shaw, Dilemmas of 'Informed Consent" in Children,
289 NEWv ENG. J. MED. 885 (1973); Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Medi-
cal Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 (1973).
14. Even when there has been relaxation of the rule against initiating such an action,
courts may for some time be unwilling to permit children to actually sue their parents for
support, on the theory that other provisions, such as the abuse and neglect laws, have been
designed to deal with support problems. Cf Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105
(1978) (children's damage actions for failure to perform parental duties not allowed).
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whom medical care has been extended. At common law a parent
was considered to have a natural but not necessarily legal duty to
support a child."5 This meant that the duty could not be enforced
through legal action. As recently as 1953, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey confronted this problem in a physician's action against
the parent of a child whom he had treated for a broken foot.' 6 The
child had been taken to a doctor by the father of one of her friends,
and in the ensuing months the parents had seen their child on
crutches and knew that she had received medical treatment. They
refused to pay for such treatment, however, because they had not
contracted with the physician for the care. Taking notice of the
common law view that a parent's obligation was only moral rather
than legal in such an instance, the court elected to follow the ap-
proach developed through equity under which a parent could be
held liable for necessities supplied to a child in an emergency or
when there was an inference that the parents had accepted them.
The decision, now regarded as a landmark, illustrates the surprising
recentness of the establishment of a clear, nonstatutory parental
duty to provide needed medical care for a child."v
State statutes specifically requiring parents to support their mi-
nor children are now widespread.' Generally, they do not abro-
gate existing common law support duties, but they do provide a
means for permitting exercise of extraordinary judicial enforcement
measures such as the contempt power. Due to constitutional con-
cerns about sex discrimination, many legislatures have amended
their statutes to restate the duty created as being owed by both
parents. 9
Equitable (or judicially established) support duties and statutory
provisions on nonsupport may be gauged by different standards
15. This is reflected in the statements of Blackstone, an eighteenth century commentator
who in recent years has been cited or quoted on the general subject of parent and child
relationships occasionally in either strange or misguided fashion. See I W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 434 (1965).
16. Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
17. Ironically, in 1983 the Greenspan holding was used by a court of another state to
support its decision that the owner of five Great Dane dogs seized by a humane society was
required to pay for support of the animals while they were in protective custody. See Bigger-
staff v. Vanderburgh Humane Soc., 453 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. App. 1983).
It is interesting to note that the New York Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children
(the first SPCC) was founded in 1875 after the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals (SPCA) had assisted in the rescue of a maltreated child a year earlier. The SPCA was
founded in 1866. See 6 DICTIONARY AM. HIsT. 331 (1976).
18. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 20-61 (1983). See also H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN
AMERICA (1981).
19. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 20-61 (1983).
1196 [Vol. 36:1190
CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CARE
with respect to the level of maintenance which will be required. The
statutory duty often assumes a basic minimum level of support.
Under the nonstatutory duty, there may be greater latitude for sub-
jective appraisal and determination based on a particular parent's
ability to maintain a support level higher than that required under
the nonsupport statute.20
2. Laws on Child Abuse and Neglect
Another group of statutes must be considered in addressing is-
sues of parental responsibility to provide medical assistance. Gen-
erally described as abuse and neglect statutes, these laws impose
upon parents the duty to provide certain basic needs to their chil-
dren on pain of criminal prosecution, temporary removal of chil-
dren from the home, or even peremptory severance of parental
rights.
Although there may be a popular view of abuse and neglect stat-
utes as involving extreme cases of failure to provide minimal suste-
nance or of intentional acts causing physical injury, a typical
statutory definition of a "dependent or neglected child" includes a
child whose parent or guardian "fails or refuses to provide proper
or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care
necessary for his health, guidance, or well-being."21 This concept,
described as "medical neglect," has gained increasing recognition.
Minors are regarded as legally incompetent for many purposes,
including the authorization of medical care for themselves.22 Thus,
a physician who performs an invasive procedure on a child in non-
emergency situations without parental consent is theoretically vul-
nerable to a tort action for battery.23 Children once were
considered virtually to be the property of their parents, 24 and thus
state intervention in order to override a parental decision concern-
20. In such jurisdictions, one might expect to find the nonsupport statutes used particu-
larly in cases involving the neediest portion of the population-those more likely to be eligible
for public assistance and Medicaid.
21. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-103(20)(d) (1983).
22. See W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVis, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1983); Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors:
The Legal Framework, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 57 (G. Melton, G.
Koocher & M. Saks eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Competence to Consent]; Batey, Rights of
Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363 (1982).
23. Battery can be defined as the unauthorized and unprivileged invasion of another
person's protected bodily interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13-20 (1965).
24. For discussion of the implications of what sometimes has been labeled the "child as
chattel" theory, see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 631 (1968).
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ing a child's medical care might have been viewed as just short of
heresy at the turn of this century. 5 Given the state of medicine at
the time, this may have been of little practical importance,z 6 though
clearly it is of legitimate concern today. Modern law has reacted
through developing a concept of medical neglect largely through
cases involving parental refusal to authorize specific medical proce-
dures considered necessary or desirable for their children.
Changes in the rules affording virtually absolute parental au-
thority came slowly at first, with courts willing to protect children
against life-threatening conditions while retaining respect for paren-
tal decisionmaking autonomy in most other instances.27 Eventually
some courts began to display a willingness to overrule parental deci-
sions when the threat to quality of life was deemed sufficiently grave
even though there was no prognosis of imminent death. 8 Older
25. The 1912 case of Tony Tuttendario, 21 P. Dist. 561 (Q.S. Phil.) a seven-year-old boy
with rickets, provides an example of this. When the child's doctors recommended surgery
and his mother refused to consent, an agent of the SPCC attempted to obtain a judicial
commitment that would allow the substitute custodian to authorize the procedure. In re-
jecting such a challenge to parental authority, the court explained, "We have not yet adopted
as public policy the Spartan rule that children belong, not to their parents, but to the state.
As the law stands, the parents forfeit their natural right of guardianship only in cases where
they have shown their unfitness by reason of moral depravity." Id. at 563.
26. The court in Tuttendaro noted that in 1911 there remained in medicine "a residuum
of the unknown . . . which scientists, by a necessary law for the development of science,
disregard, but which parents, in their natural love for their children, regard with apprehen-
sion and terror." Id.
27. Compare People ex reL Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952)
(judicially authorizing blood transfusion for a child in the face of religiously based parental
objection) with Matter of Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (no intervention to
overrule parental decision refusing to consent to surgery for correcting cleft palate) and In re
Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (no intervention with parental decision not to
permit amputation of oversized arm posing strains on body systems).
28. Probably the best known illustration of this is In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. Ulster Cty. 1970), afd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328
N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). Over a mother's religious objection, the courts appointed a guardian
with authority to consent to essentially corrective surgery for a child whose face was grossly
deformed due to neurofibromatosis. Because the objectionable growth was clinically benign
and the proposed surgical intervention was substantial, one might analyze the case as one in
which the operation was essentially cosmetic in purpose but also was potentially life threaten-
ing in nature. The trial court explained one basis for appointing the guardian:
I am persuaded that if this court is to meet its responsibilities to this boy it can
neither shift the responsibility onto his shoulders nor can it permit his mother's
religious beliefs to stand in the way of attaining through corrective surgery
whatever chance he may have for a normal, happy existence, which.., is difficult of
attainment under the most propitious circumstances, but will unquestionably be
impossible if the disfigurement is not corrected.
65 Misc. 2d at 674, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 657. Not all courts have agreed with the New York
court's rationale in Sampson. For an opposing view, see In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d
387 (1972), aff'd, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
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minors may now consent to some procedures as a result of either
special statutory authorization or what is described as the "mature
minor" rule.29 But for very young children and in cases involving
elective procedures (even for older adolescents), the concept of med-
ical neglect is of considerable importance as a means of assuring
that parents obtain needed medical care for their children.
a. Federal Involvement in Setting Standards for Care of Defec-
tive Neonates Under the Concept of Medical Neglect. A detailed re-
view of the actions and assertions of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) in the saga of the babies Doe would extend
beyond the scope of this Article. It is important, however, to un-
derstand that after two sets of administrative regulations faltered in
the face of formidable legal obstacles,30 a third approach was taken
by Congress in the enactment of the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984.31 These amendments require that states wishing to qualify
for federal assistance in developing and enforcing child abuse and
neglect prevention and treatment programs must establish certain
procedures or programs "for the purpose of responding to the re-
porting of medical neglect (including instances of withholding of
medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life threat-
ening conditions... ).32 The amendments include detailed elabo-
ration on the types of programs required and redefine "child abuse
and neglect" so as to place special emphasis on the meaning of
"withholding of medically indicated treatment."33 This approach
was further amplified in the third set of Baby Doe Regulations pub-
lished in April 1985 under the direction of the congressional
amendment.34
The various state laws addressing the measures that must be
29. For further discussion of development of the mature minor rule, see Wadlington,
Minors and Health Care: The Age of Medical Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 117-20
(1973). Special statutes authorizing children to consent to their own medical care in limited
instances are discussed at infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
30. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983);
United States v. University Hosp. of State Univ. of New York, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
In Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 54 U.S.L.W. 4579 (U.S. June 10, 1986), the Supreme
Court held that the HHS regulations were not authorized by § 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation
Act.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5105 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). For detailed commentary, see
Lund, Infanticide, Physicians, and the Law: The "Baby Doe"Amendments to the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 11 AM. J. LAw & MED. 1 (1985); Vitiello, The Baby Jane Doe
Litigation and Section 504: An Exercise in Raw Executive Power, 17 CONN. L. REV. 95
(1984).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(k) (Supp. II 1984).
33. Id.
34. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 1340).
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taken in dealing with defective neonates vary substantially.35 Loui-
siana's statute36 is both the most explicit and inclusive. In addition
to provisions prohibiting denial of nutrients or treatment, the stat-
ute provides a way in which parents may surrender their child to
the state Department of Human Resources or another licensed
adoption agency if they refuse to consent to treatment, without nec-
essarily terminating their financial responsibility for medical
expenses.37
Instances of federal involvement in expanding the concept of
medical neglect have been largely in the context of withholding
treatment or life support systems from defective neonates, an issue
over which there is considerable polarization of personal and medi-
cal views. From the standpoint of this Article, however, it is impor-
tant to note two factors through which federal involvement can
have impact beyond the poignant problems of defective neonates.
One is the more than symbolic reinforcement of the concept of med-
ical neglect as a basis for state intervention.38 The other is that de-
spite the elaborate administrative regulations and legislation, there
has been little willingness to face such issues as who will pay for
what constitutes the most expensive child care and treatment. Re-
cently, Congress has directed the Department of Health and
Human Services to study ways to fund care and treatment of such
infants independently of Medicaid.39
b. Child Abuse Reporting Statutes. An important component
of the scheme for protecting children against abuse and neglect is
the modem system of mandatory reporting laws. Statutory propos-
als of this type were enacted on an unusually rapid and widespread
35. Some such laws were adopted prior to the federal regulation in response to the cele-
brated Indiana "baby Doe" case that occurred in 1982. For the specific Indiana response, see
IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3(7)(f) (Supp. 1985), which declares that "a child in need of services...
includes a handicapped child who is deprived of nutrition that is necessary to sustain life, or
who is deprived of medical or surgical intervention that is necessary to ameliorate a life
threatening medical condition, if the nutrition ... is generally provided to similarly situated
• . . nonhandicapped children."
36. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.36.1 (West Supp. 1985).
37. See id. at § 1299.36.2.A. Physicians also are required to report parental refusal to
consent to treatment and are protected from liability if they provide medical care when delay
would be life threatening. Id. at § 40:1299.3 6.2.B. For further discussion of the question of
who must pay after such a relinquishment, see infra notes 63-98 and accompanying text.
38. With the third Baby Doe regulation relying heavily on state enforcement measures,
this is especially important.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (1982 & Supp. I 1984). For further discussion of these issues
see Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1283 (1985).
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scale by legislatures beginning some twenty years ago.4° They re-
quire physicians and other health care providers41 to inform a gov-
ernmental agency about cases of suspected child abuse that come to
their professional attention. By this time, many of the original stat-
utes have gone through several stages of revision and expansion.
Although the drafters of the original versions may not have fully
anticipated or intended it, health care professionals have used these
statutes to report cases of medical neglect.
3. New Teeth For an Old Enforcement Process
Attempts to enforce private child and family support obligations
in order to lessen economic burdens on state public assistance pro-
grams are by no means new. In 1950, a time when family law was
characterized by lack of uniformity and it could realistically have
been described as a major bastion of states' rights, a uniform law
known as the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA)
was published.42 Soon afterward it was widely adopted by state leg-
islatures for the avowed purpose of simplifying enforcement of pri-
vate support obligations across state lines. Even after subsequent
revisions,43 many critics considered the act to be an ineffective col-
lection mechanism because it relied largely on its in terrorem ef-
fect.' This concern began dissipating after the adoption of the
Child Support and Establishment of Paternity amendments to the
Social Security Act in 197445 and 1975.46 These amendments pro-
vided minimum standards with which state programs must comply
in order to remain eligible for federal cost sharing. They also pro-
vided for inauguration of programs such as a parent locator service
utilizing social security numbers, waiver of sovereign immunity by
40. For a contemporary discussion of their development, see Paulsen, Parker & Adel-
man, Child Abuse Laws: Some Legislative History, 34 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1966). See
also W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIs, supra note 22, at 759.
41. Some people outside the health care system, such as teachers, social workers, and
probation officers, may also be required to report. Other persons who are not required to
report may be given an incentive to do so through providing immunity from liability for
reporting. See, eg., VA. CODE §§ 63.1-248.3, 63.1-248.4 (1983).
42. 9 U.L.A. 747 (1979).
43. Subsequent versions were promulgated in 1952 and 1958, and in 1968 a revised ver-
sion (known as RURESA) was completed. See 9 U.L.A. 643 (1979).
44. Major reasons for this were the problem of locating peripatetic or intentionally elu-
sive obligors and the lack of incentives for officials in a responding state to process petitions
promptly.
45. Child Support & Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (Supp. II
1984).
46. Amendments Relating to Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 94-88, 89 Stat. 433
(1975).
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the United States with regard to child support payments due from
federal employees, and certification by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to the federal courts of certain support enforce-
ment actions without respect to the amount in controversy.47
Even more effective measures now are being introduced in re-
sponse to the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
(CSEA).as Again, states are required to enact certain provisions in
order to maintain continued federal participation in the funding of
public assistance programs. The mandated provisions for aiding in
the collection of overdue support obligations include simplified and
speedy withholding from wages, deductions from tax refunds, meth-
ods requiring an absent parent to give security, and procedures for
establishing liens against real or personal property.49 Some states
provide that support payments made by the parent of a child on
public assistance will be paid directly to the public agency responsi-
ble for child support enforcement, with only the amount in excess of
the public grant being remitted to the obligee5 0
The new provisions, combined with the earlier ones (including
RURESA), establish what unquestionably will be a far more organ-
ized means for enforcing private support obligations, including
those for medical assistance. The reason for them is economic-to
shift state expenditures for child or family support to private obli-
gors. Although cutting costs of medical assistance may not have
been perceived as a primary goal, it was recognized as one of the
areas in which state expenditures could be reduced.
B. Children's Financial Responsibility for
Their Own Medical Care
Determining whether children will be obligated to pay for their
own medical care raises a series of new and old legal issues. The old
ones stem from traditional common law limitations on minors' con-
tractual capacity, discussed earlier in the context of children's long-
standing incapacity to consent to medical treatment. The new ones
47. For greater discussion of these federal provisions see H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT
IN AMERICA 281 (1981).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. 1985).
49. See id. States are expected to honor requests for withholding that come from other
jurisdictions. A Model Interstate Withholding Act has been developed by the ABA National
Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection in cooperation with the National
Conference of State Legislatures. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, MODEL INTERSTATE INCOME WITHHOLDING ACT
WITH COMMENTS (1984).
50. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.551 (West Supp. 1986).
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reflect the trend toward granting increased personal autonomy to
minors in response to what is sometimes labeled (or mislabeled) the
"children's rights" movement.
At common law, minors were largely incompetent to execute
binding contracts of any sort, and this rule remains widespread. In
its strictest version, a minor can disaffirm a contract for the
purchase of an item not classifiable as a necessity without incurring
any liability for use, depreciation, damage or other diminution in
property value following the purchase. 1  A recent Wisconsin
Supreme Court case51 indicates how the rule can affect an obliga-
tion to pay for medical services. An unmarried minor was hospital-
ized for the birth of a child. Medicaid paid only that part of the bill
directly related to care of the infant, so the hospital sought reim-
bursement for the remainder of the bill from the minor patient and
the infant's father, who had married the mother after she left the
hospital. A claim against the mother's father was dismissed on the
procedural basis of failure to obtain service of process. The appeals
court affirmed dismissal of the claim against the minor patient on
the ground that even though hospital care could be regarded as a
necessity in this instance, there was no showing that she had ex-
pressly or impliedly agreed to make payment after she attained her
majority. The court indicated that the duty to pay could have been
imposed on the patient's father 3 if he had been properly before the
court. The court eventually rationalized a way to hold the patient's
new husband liable based on his paternity, even though it was a
premarital obligation of the mother.
As the preceding case indicates, rules allowing minors to disaf-
firm their contracts still retain considerable vitality. They are now
under attack, however, as part of the trend toward earlier recogni-
tion of minors' capacity to act for themselves either generally or
specifically with regard to such matters as medical treatment. The
latter area is where the most significant developments have oc-
curred, and it is of special moment for this analysis. As noted ear-
lier, parental consent historically has been required for medical
51. Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis. 2d 241, 298 N.W.2d 562 (1980), is the case widely cited
to epitomize this dilemma in today's world.
52. Madison Gen. Hosp. v. Haack, 124 Wis. 2d 398, 369 N.W.2d 663 (1985).
53. In addition to providing new enforcement mechanisms, some states have extended
the statutory support duty among family members. Under an Act adopted in Wisconsin
during 1985 (1985 Wisconsin Act 56), the minor mother's parents might be required to sup-
port the minor's children during their minority. See Wis. STAT. § 49.19(4)(a) (Vest Supp.
1986).
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treatment of children except in emergencies. 4 In response to
problems that might flow from parental consent requirements in sit-
uations where the minors might be reluctant to consult or confide in
their parents, state legislatures recently have adopted statutes per-
mitting minors to consent to medical treatment for themselves in
certain enumerated cases." Conditions or circumstances usually
specified are alcohol and substance abuse, crisis mental health coun-
seling, family planning, pregnancy,5 6 and certain contagious dis-
eases. As a matter of policy, these laws reflect the substantial
degree of change (some might say breakdown) that has taken place
in the modem family. The selection of particular medical condi-
tions for which minors can independently consent to treatment ob-
viously was rooted in expediency. It reflects the fear that a child
might not obtain timely medical care in those cases, thereby exacer-
bating drug related problems, threatening the spread of contagious
disease, increasing unwanted pregnancies, or postponing prenatal
care.
Two sets of problems have been created by the new minor con-
sent statutes. One group stems from the failure to define the per-
missible and required scope of communication between physicians
and the parents of their minor patients who consent in accordance
with the statutes.57 The other concerns liability for medical treat-
ment. The IJA/ABA Standards Relating to Rights of Minors, an
important contemporary statement of goals and a blueprint for leg-
islative reform, affirms the basic duty of parents to be liable to per-
sons providing medical treatment to their children "if the parent
consents to such services, or if the services are provided under
54. For more complete discussion of the issues, see Competence to Consent, supra note
22, at 57.
55. See id. at 61. For an example of such a minor consent statute, see VA. CODE § 54-
325.2 (Supp. 1985).
56. A minor's consent to abortion, however, typically is dealt with in a separate statu-
tory provision. Litigation over the extent to which a state can legislate to require or promote
parental involvement in a pregnant minor's decision with respect to abortion has appeared
frequently on the U.S. Supreme Court's docket in recent years. See, eg., Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (declaring constitutional a
state statute requiring minors seeking an abortion to obtain parental consent or a Juvenile
Court declaration that they are mature enough to decide independently); City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional
a state statute requiring either parental or judicial consent for all minors under 15 seeking an
abortion); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a state statute requiring physi-
cians to notify parents of an unemancipated and immature minor upon whom an abortion is
to be performed).
57. This is also relevant to the issue of professional malpractice liability. See infra notes
107-09 and accompanying text.
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emergency circumstances .. *"58 However the standards express
the view that a minor who consents to medical treatment under a
special enabling statute should also be financially liable for such
services and should not disaffirm any such obligation because of mi-
nority.59 In what many consider a well-meaning but impractical
attempt to balance the minor patient's right to privacy and the
problem of securing payment, the standards propose that insurance
coverage should be payable under any policy in which the minor is
a beneficiary even though the child rather than the parent has con-
sented to the treatment. 60 However, no private or public health in-
surer should inform the parent or policyholder that such a claim
has been filed unless the treating physician has previously notified
the parent. Anyone who has dealt with billing procedures of either
Blue Cross or most private health insurers is bound to express skep-
ticism about the workability of the last part of the proposal, but it
reflects the trend toward according greater recognition of personal
rights of minors.
Some newer statutes specify not only that a minor cannot disaf-
firm a contract for medical care that was received, but also that the
parent, guardian, or spouse of such a minor has no liability to pay
for such care in the absence of a specific agreement to do so. 61 A
possible concern prompted by such statutes is that some parents
might refuse to consent (or choose to have their minor children con-
sent) in order to avoid financial responsibility. This in turn poses
the question whether such conduct might be construed as constitut-
ing abuse or neglect, or whether the statute provides a tacit excep-
tion under the circumstances. 62
C. Family Law Techniques for Ending or Replacing Parental
Rights and Duties
Increased concern about defining rights and duties that flow be-
tween children and parents without regard to the gender or marital
status of the latter has been part of what some describe as the "con-
stitutionalization" of family law in recent years. This has been ac-
companied by questions about what procedural requirements are
58. IJA/ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Rights of Mi-
nors 59 (1980).
59. Ia at 61.
60. Id.
61. See, eg., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-404 (1985).
62. The question might not be perceived as a problem with regard to elective
procedures.
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necessary if a state wishes to terminate parental rights. 63 These de-
velopments have also affected existing procedures for adoption,
through which a new "legal" parent may be substituted for a bio-
logical parent. Once used in ancient societies to accomplish some of
the same goals for which the modem will was developed,"4 adoption
could in the future become important as a means for shifting re-
sponsibility for children's medical needs, either voluntarily or
involuntarily.
1. Adoption
Through the mechanism of adoption, an existing parent-child
relationship is terminated and a new parent is substituted to assume
all legal rights and duties of parenthood. Though not an indigenous
American legal institution,65 adoption has been reshaped by our
legal system over the past century as a special means for providing
homes and families for minor children who have no living parents
or whose parents are unwilling or incapable of caring for them.
There is no effective, widespread system of long-term child-care in-
stitutions in this country today. Orphanages began to disappear or
change focus many years ago66 and were replaced by a system of
foster care and adoptive placement institutions operated by public
agencies and state-licensed private organizations. By mid-century,
most adoption laws had been refined to provide for judicial involve-
ment and screening of the potential adopters and their homes by
some responsible agency (at least in the case of non-relative adop-
tions) before a final decree. Some states placed narrow limits on
"private placements" for adoption involving previously unrelated
parties, thus increasing the importance of the agency placement
process.
For many years demand for adoptable children has exceeded
63. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) ("Before a state may sever com-
pletely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that
the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."); Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) ("The Constitution does not require the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status determination proceeding.
The decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel is to be answered in
the first instance by the trial court, subject to appellate review.").
64. See Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743
(1956).
65. For further discussion of the development of American adoption law, see Presser,
The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971);
Wadlington, Minimum Age Difference as a Requisite for Adoption, 1966 DUKE L.J. 392.
66. For a discussion of some of the legal problems thus presented, see In re Milne's
Succession, 230 La. 729, 89 So. 2d 281 (1956).
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supply, often by a substantial margin.6 7 During an earlier time this
probably was affected by the prevailing emphasis on placements of
healthy children immediately after birth. During that period spe-
cific criteria, some of which would be at best of questionable legal
validity today, were used by some agencies to establish adopter eli-
gibility. Such requirements as a low age ceiling, no prior divorces,
or conformity with certain social or religious standards severely
limited the pool of persons who might adopt through agency
placements.
In recent years a combination of social, legal, and economic
changes6" has led to further decline in the number of normal,
healthy infants available for adoption, while the demand for adopta-
ble children has increased. This imbalance has had varying impact,
ranging from the demise of some placement agencies to shifts in the
major function of others. It also has led to the expansion of efforts
to include children with "special needs" in the adoption pool. That
label generally extends to several well-defined groups of children
who once were considered difficult to place and, as a result, largely
remained outside the adoption process. Older children, members of
a larger sibling group needing placement together, children of mi-
nority racial or ethnic origins, and children with mental or physical
handicaps or special medical demands are typically regarded as
having special needs.
Although they may not constitute the largest number of "hard
to place" children, this Article addresses only the problems of hand-
icapped and medically needy children. Locating prospective adop-
tive parents who are able to cope with the problems of children with
handicaps or severe medical needs presents one problem. Providing
services and funding poses another.
a. Subsidized Adoption: A New and Innovative Approach. Sub-
sidized adoption, a special procedure for facilitating adoption of
children with special needs, has achieved wide legislative enactment
since New York passed the first enabling statute less than two de-
67. Exact figures relating to adoption are difficult to determine today because of a lack
of centralized statistical reporting. For a view of the general dimensions, see Plumez, Adop-
tion: Where Have All the Babies Gone?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 34,
col. 1.
68. These include legal access to abortion and contraceptive information and devices;
changes in social and legal positions on legitimacy; greater economic access to child care
assistance for single mothers who previously might have relinquished their children for adop-
tion; the desire of many unwed fathers for custody of their children; and the development of
better mechanisms for proving paternity and fixing and enforcing paternal support duties.
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cades ago.69 It opened to mixed reviews, probably because of both
insufficient understanding of what it was designed to do and skepti-
cism about governmental willingness to provide adequate funding.7°
One commentator noted the irony of this reception, pointing out
that "[i]n a society in which two of the most cherished values are
children and money, it is surprising that a proposal holding promise
of both has met with much resistance."7 The reference to saving
money as well as children compares long term foster care with legal
adoption by parents who want the child. Money can be saved be-
cause the cost of subsidized adoption for the state is less than that of
foster care,72 and it is generally perceived that adoption is psycho-
logically superior to serial foster homes.
Subsidized adoption received an enormous boost with Congres-
sional passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980.73 Prior to 1980, federal funds were available for assisting fos-
ter care but not for adoption. This provided a disincentive for state
placement of "special needs" children for adoption under subsidy.
The 1980 law extended the scope of federal financial assistance to
subsidized adoption. Each state must now provide such adoption
assistance in order to qualify for participation in the federal AFDC
program.74 Children eligible for the federal subsidy contribution
must have "special needs" and qualify for AFDC or SSI benefits.75
The amount of governmental assistance can vary according to the
adoptive parents' circumstances and the child's special needs,
although federal assistance cannot exceed what the child would
have received from that source if the child had been placed in foster
care.
76
69. For the present version of the New York law, see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 450-58
(McKinney 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1986). All states now have some provision for adoption
assistance. For a general discussion of the various approaches, see Hardy, Adoption of Chil-
dren with Special Needs, A National Perspective, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 901 (1984).
70. For example, the original California statute included a three-year limitation period
on payments. See 1968 Cal. Stat. c. 1322-2498. This limitation was increased to five years
in 1975 and finally removed in 1982 with respect to payments starting after that date. See
CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE § 16120(b) (1975 West Supp. 1986).
71. Watson, Subsidized Adoption: A Crucial Investment, 51 CHILD WELFARE 220-24
(1972).
72. One cost advantage of subsidized adoption is that it obviates the need for ongoing
state monitoring and supervision of foster placements.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28 and §§ 670-76 (1982). For a detailed review of this Act and its
subsequent administration, see Bussiere, Federal Adoption Assistance for Children with Special
Needs, 19 CLEARINGHOuSE REV. 587 (1985).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(20) (1982).
75. Id. at § 673(a)(1).
76. Id. at § 673(a)(2).
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Children eligible for fedrally assisted subsidized adoption pro-
grams also are eligible for Medicaid because they are deemed to be
dependent children and AFDC recipients. Problems have arisen,
however, in some interstate placements or in situations in which a
family has moved to another state after completing a subsidized
adoption. Although the state in which the subsidy adoption agree-
ment 77 was made can simply send the basic payments to the client's
out-of-state address, third party providers in one state may be reluc-
tant to accept another state's Medicaid card for reasons ranging
from a concern about extra paperwork and payment delays to the
possibility that some services may not be covered under the other
state's program. A key feature of the federal Act is its intended
reliance on interstate compacts to remedy such problems in our mo-
bile society. Suggested language for an Interstate Compact on
Adoption and Medical Assistance, developed by the American Pub-
lic Welfare Association under an HHS grant and published in 1983,
addresses the problem by providing for issuance of identification for
medical assistance in the state where the child resides. It also sug-
gests a formula under which the state of adoption would pay for
services it normally would cover if such costs are not included
under the program of the state of the child's residence. Enabling
legislation that would allow appropriate agencies to enter into such
compacts has been adopted by only a small number of states thus
far, although HHS has issued instructions on the level of required
compliance with medical assistance reimbursement across state
lines even if a state has not entered into such a compact. 78
In summary, recent developments in the area of subsidized
adoption have focused on the goal of providing stable families for
children with handicaps or special medical needs, as opposed to rel-
egating them to long-term foster care that could involve a series of
homes where emotional and developmental requirements may not
be met. Although statistical information is sparse, there is some
indication that children with special medical handicaps or needs are
becoming an increasingly larger portion of those served by this pro-
gram. However, as cost-containment pressures increase, needed ex-
pansion may be in a precarious condition because of the dependency
on Medicaid eligibility and further problems of interstate enforce-
ment and inconsistency of services.
77. The written subsidy or adoption assistance agreement is a key part of the individual-
ized approach to subsidized adoption. For discussion of matters that should be addressed in
negotiating such an agreement, see Bussiere, supra note 73, at 587, 590-91.
78. For a critique and overview of the model Compact, see id. at 594.
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There is a legitimate concern that subsidized adoption has been
viewed too much as a cost-containment mechanism, although many
obviously have supported it as an alternative to further expansion of
what is regarded as a deeply troubled foster care system. To func-
tion properly in cases where the special needs are medical, the
promise of cost reduction may not be fully justifiable if the program
is to accomplish its "child saving" goal effectively.
The question sometimes is raised as to whether children may
enter the adoption process rather than remain in foster care when
the children are under foster care in the first place largely because of
financial inadequacies of parents who might function satisfactorily
if the subsidized adoption funding were instead given to them. This
question may deserve serious policy consideration, but it should not
be assumed that channelling funding to the natural parents would
resolve all the cases in which subsidized adoption of children with
special medical needs is being attempted. For example, the require-
ment that a child must be eligible for AFDC can serve to limit the
use of subsidized adoption of a child relinquished by a financially
capable parent in order to avoid future responsibility for medical
costs of a child with a permanent or long-term handicap.
b. Voluntary Adoptive Placement as a Means of Obtaining
Medical Insurance Coverage. Without reliable data one can only
speculate about what is occurring or might occur as medical costs
increase and parents feel incapable of coping with the needs of their
children. In that vein one should consider that a possible avenue
available to such parents is to voluntarily relinquish their children
for adoption by someone with adequate medical insurance. If the
adopter is a close relative, perhaps even a member of the same ex-
tended household, the adoption easily could be considered as taking
place entirely for the purpose of securing insurance benefits. Mod-
em laws typically provide for facilitating private placements be-
tween certain close relatives through such means as eliminating the
number of judicial proceedings involved or deemphasizing certain
review procedures.
Although there is insufficient data documenting the extent of
this practice, a West Virginia Supreme Court opinion,79 well known
in family law for its explication of the "primary caretaker" doctrine
as the criterion for determining child custody, substantiates the
existence and acknowledgment of the practice. The mother of an
infant with a chronic respiratory infection requiring hospitalization
79. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
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and "considerable medical attention" consented to the adoption of
her child by the mother's grandparents in order to qualify the child
for coverage under the grandfather's hospitalization and medical in-
surance.8" Before the child's birth the mother had separated from
the father, to whom she was not married, and returned to live with
her grandparents. Although the child's father had not been sup-
porting the child, he opposed the adoption and sought custody
when the grandparents petitioned for adoption. A key issue before
the court was whether the mother's consent to the adoption consti-
tuted abandonment, thereby making her an unfit parent. The court
found that there had been no abandonment under the circum-
stances, but rather that the mother had "mobilized all of the re-
sources at her command, namely the solicitous regard of her
grandparents, in the interest of this child and that she went to ex-
traordinary lengths to provide for him adequate medical attention
and financial support."'" The court also noted that "it is well rec-
ognized that mothers in penurious circumstances often resort to
adoption in order to make the child eligible for social security or
union welfare benefits, all of which significantly enhance the child's
opportunities in life."82
Even though one can only speculate about the extent to which
adoption is used to enroll a child for medical coverage, the ease with
which this can be accomplished and the pressures that may dictate
its use must be recognized. This is not among the traditional pur-
poses for which adoption was developed, but one should not ignore
that qualifying a child for medical coverage is a new need that is in
some ways comparable to factors considered by unwed mothers sev-
eral decades ago when deciding whether to relinquish children for
adoption in order to afford them better opportunities in life.
c. Voluntary Relinquishment for Adoption to End Parental Du-
ties, Including Financial Liability. There are well-known, recurring
instances in which parents may seek to end all financial obligations
for a child through consenting to private adoption by a specific per-
son or through relinquishment to an adoptive placement agency.
83
The former is illustrated by the noncustodial parent who, though
80. The grandfather, with whom the granddaughter and her child were residing, was a
retired coal miner with liberal medical benefits. Id. at 359.
81. Id. at 364.
82. Id.
83. Relinquishment might also be made to a private individual in some states. However,
this is less likely to carry the same degree of finality that often is accorded the agency
placement.
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required to pay for child support, has little or no meaningful rela-
tionship with the child and therefore consents to adoption by a step-
parent.84 The latter is exemplified by the mother who does not wish
to bear the extra economic and social burdens that can fall on a
single parent and thus relinquishes her child to an agency.8 5 In the
past, both cases have usually been viewed in the context of the par-
ent relinquishing a normal, healthy child. A scenario of growing
concern today involves a parental desire to relinquish a child with
irremediable defects or medical problems likely to be remediable
only at the cost of draining all of the parents' assets. This is by no
means farfetched. It echoes the theme of a celebrated forty-year-old
case in which a father had killed his child in what would generally
be described as an act of euthanasia.86 The issue before the court
was whether the father, who in an earlier proceeding had been con-
victed of manslaughter and placed on probation, was of "good
moral character" for purposes of becoming a U.S. citizen through
naturalization. The court's remarks indicated its assumption that
the father's motive was the nurture of his other four children
"which was being compromised by the burden imposed upon him in
the care of the fifth."87 Had the alternative been relinquishment of
the child to the state or adoption, one wonders whether the out-
come would have been different.
In assessing the likelihood that this could become a serious
problem, one should understand that parents may owe a legal duty
of support to their incapacitated children if the incapacity continues
past majority.88 Although many states have statutory provisions
84. Although there is an increasing tendency to impose child support duties on a step-
parent who is married to and living with the custodial legal parent, usually these duties are
secondary to the duties of the noncustodial natural parent and will end on dissolution of the
marriage between the stepparent and the custodial parent unless the stepparent has adopted
the child or continues to enjoy a special in loco parentis relationship. See, eg., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 453.400 (Supp. 1986); Washington Statewide Organization of Stepparents v. Smith,
85 Wash. 2d 564, 536 P.2d 1202 (1975).
85. Another variation of this can be the case of a child born to a married woman when
her husband is not the parent. While once there would have been a strong, often unchal-
lengeable, presumption of the husband's paternity, this scenario is increasing in complexity
today through both the erosion or disappearance of older rules barring husband and wife
from testifying if it would affect their child's legitimacy, and the increased recognition of the
standing of the biological father to assert paternity.
86. Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
87. Id. at 152.
88. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS 505 (1968); Elkins v. Elkins, 553
S.W.2d 34 (Ark. 1977) (upholding a judicial decree that obligated the father to continue child
support payments as long as the dyslexic child was attending college); Commonwealth v.
Shepard, 212 Va. 843, 188 S.E.2d 99 (1972) (holding the estate of an incompetent mother
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that formally provide for voluntary relinquishment of parental
rights, such laws were probably enacted in order to provide a means
for avoiding costly and time consuming court proceedings in in-
stances where less than adequate parents would at least acquiesce in
the termination of their rights. That these provisions might, in the
absence of further legislative direction, be construed as establishing
a "right" to relinquish a child because of his special medical needs
seems questionable-particularly in a time of state concern about
shouldering medical costs.
A more likely course would be for the state to remove the child
from the home while seeking continued support from the parents.
As noted earlier, Louisiana has enacted a provision stating that par-
ents of a child who refuse to consent to care and treatment of a
child under their particular "Baby Doe" style enactment "shall at
all times be free to execute a voluntary act of surrender" to a state
or other adoptive placement agency.89 However, the statute also
provides:
All medical expenses incurred by the Department of Health and
Human Resources on behalf of the child shall be reimbursed by
the parent or parents of the child, provided they have not been
declared financially needy. No medical insurer of the parent or
parents of a child who would have otherwise been liable for such
medical expenses may deny liability to their insured solely be-
cause of the parent or parents desire to withhold medical or sur-
gical treatment for their child.90
The statute further provides that the agency to which the child is
relinquished shall immediately provide treatment and "make every
effort" to find an adoptive home.91 It makes no reference to the
potential long-term medical obligation of the relinquishing parents.
However, the "financially needy" limitation to required reimburse-
ment could conceivably be construed to deal with the problem of a
child ineligible for federal subsidized adoption assistance by virtue
of not being qualified for AFDC.92
It should be noted that Congress has authorized the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to make grants to states to help with
the establishment, operation, or implemention of "programs to help
liable for maintaining her son who lived in a mental hospital); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61
(1983).
89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2 (West 1984). See supra notes 36-37 and ac-
companying text.
90. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2 (West 1984).
91. IM
92. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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in obtaining or coordinating necessary services, including social and
health services and financial assistance for families with disabled in-
fants with life-threatening conditions, and those services necessary to
facilitate adoptive placement of such infants who have been relin-
quished for adoption."93
2. Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights for Failure to
Meet a Child's Health Care Needs
Adoption serves to shift parental rights, but it requires either the
consent of existing parents or formal termination of their legal
rights as parents. Termination of parental rights can be based on
incapacity or unwillingness to care for a child's medical needs,
though ordinarily such peremptory action is taken only in extreme
cases.9 4 Such cases are distinguishable from situations in which the
state intervenes to overrule a specific parental decision about medi-
cal care. The latter, though known as medical neglect, is viewed by
some courts as involving little, if any, moral culpability on the part
of the nonconsenting parent.95
One might ask why parental rights should be terminated for fail-
ure or unwillingness to provide medical care. One answer might be
to free a child for adoptive placement with parents who will extend
such care.96 But many such children will be difficult to place for
93. 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). See also id. at § 5111.
94. In re M.L.G., 317 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. App. 1984) illustrates the type of case in which
parental rights have been terminated because of physical or mental inability to meet a child's
special medical needs. The particular child had been born without a sacrum, resulting in
paralysis of her bladder that required maintenance of an ileostomy bag after a cutaneous
vesicotomy. The parents were separated and the child had been placed in foster care by court
order. The father, an alcoholic, had a history of beating the wife and on one occasion had
knocked the child from a couch, causing her stoma to bleed. He was unemployed, lived alone
in a trailer, was delinquent in child support payments, and had indicated to a case worker
that he felt it inappropriate for him to have to change his nine-year-old daughter's ileostomy
bag. The mother also had a record of excessive drinking and failure to maintain a sanitary
living environment or even to bathe the child during the period when she was with her for
weekend visits. On one occasion she applied a plastic sandwich bag to the ileostomy rather
than the appropriate medical bag.
95. For example, in In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. Ulster
Cty. 1970), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972), the court over-
ruled a mother's refusal to consent to corrective surgery for her son, but nevertheless stated
that the adjudication "in no way imports a finding that the mother failed in her duty to her
child in any other respect." 65 Misc. at 676, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
96. Though it may be only peripheral to the current inquiry because of its key focus on
costs, note should be taken of the increasing willingness of some courts to consider the con-
cept of "psychological parenthood" as a factor in determining child custody independent of a
blood relationship of parent and child. The cases regarding the guardianship of Phillip B.
provide a possibly relevant example. A fourteen-year-old boy with Down's Syndrome was
institutionalized by his parents soon after birth. Subsequently a legal controversy developed
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adoption because of their medical needs. Some children might qual-
ify for subsidized adoption that could include Medicaid coverage.
If they do not, the state simply may be relieving the natural parents
of further financial responsibility through the termination proce-
dure. Those interested in child protection would say that termina-
tion should be predicated on parental incapacity or misconduct,
whether or not an adoptive placement is likely to take place.97
However, reluctance to take such steps is likely if they will result in
greater cost to the state before it is certain that an adoptive place-
ment will materialize.98
III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE TORT SYSTEM ON CHILDREN'S
HEALTH CARE COSTS
The impact of professional liability under tort law could be in-
creasingly significant, though projections are difficult to quantify.
Costs of medical services might be expected to escalate due to the
costs of defensive medical practice and increases in liability expo-
sure and insurance premiums. The question to consider here is
whether children's health care is more vulnerable to cost increases
than other areas of medical practice. Once again, there are special
legal and practical concerns that should be considered.
Until recently, practitioners in the children's health care field
(other than those with narrowly defined specialties) usually were
not cast into the more expensive professional liability insurance cat-
egories occupied by such specialists as surgeons, anesthesiologists,
and orthopedists. This is still the case for family and general pedi-
atric practice, though not for neonatology and obstetrics.9 9 The in-
crease in the number and severity of claims associated with birth-
over whether a guardian should be appointed to authorize a cardic catheterization. The court
held that the state had not met its burden of establishing clear and convincing reason. In re
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 803, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 52 (1979). Subsequently, two volun-
teer workers at the institution where the child resided were successful in petitioning to be-
come his guardian on the basis of having become his psychological parents. The court
explained that "it is the emotional abandonment of Phillip, not his institutionalization, which
inevitably has created the unusual circumstancs which led to the award of limited custody to
respondents." Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 424, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 792
(1983) (emphasis in original).
97. For a different point of view, see Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35
STAN. L. REv. 423 (1983).
98. The cost may be increased in some cases by a difficult and time consuming legal
procedure.
99. It must be recognized that some family practitioners deliver babies, which can in-
crease their professional liability insurance costs. Of all the groups mentioned, the greatest
liability risk is generally considered to be associated with practices related to the birth
process.
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related procedures has become of special concern, and attention is
being focused on the degree to which this increase is affecting deliv-
ery of services." Some health care professionals are limiting their
obstetrical practice. Nurse midwives are in a particularly precari-
ous position because of difficulty in obtaining liability insurance
coverage at a cost that would allow them to continue practice. Be-
cause many nurse practitioners and midwives have historically
served lower income mothers, the impact will fall most heavily on
those most unable to afford to see a physician.
Among the possible explanations given for the liability crisis in
obstetrics are inadequate practices and risk management, increased
specialization, and new technology coupled with a time lag in ade-
quate training for its use. If these are significantly contributing fac-
tors to the liability crisis in obstetrics, one might postulate that
similar developments could occur in pediatric practice. Increasing
demands for expertise in areas such as genetic screening and coun-
seling provide illustrations, though whether such practices will set-
tle into the domain of pediatrics rather than another specialty is
uncertain.
One special factor in tort law involving children's actions is the
extended time period during which such actions can be commenced.
In many states a statute of limitations will not begin to toll until a
child reaches majority, generally age eighteen.101 Some states have
reduced this time period, but not all such modifications have sur-
vived constitutional attacks based on their limited applicability to
medical malpractice cases. 10 2 It is difficult to assess the effect on
physicians' costs of this extended period for bringing actions.
However, uncertainty is one factor that often is identified as the
cause of inflated liability insurance rates. An obvious concern is
that the passage of time may make defense of a case more difficult
100. Attention is being focused on the possible reasons for the increase in claims, ranging
from the vagaries of the tort system to inadequate medical risk management. With regard to
the latter, see Julian, Investigation of Obstetric Malpractice Closed Claims: Profile ofEvent, 2
AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 320 (1985).
101. For an illustration of such a provision for extension, see VA. CODE § 8.01-229
(1984).
102. See, e.g., Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983); Schwan v. Riverside Method-
ist Hospital, 6 Ohio St.3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983). Some states have upheld the validity
of legislation shortening statutes of limitations even when applied to children. See, eg.,
Rohrabaugh v. Wagner, 274 Ind. 661, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980); Reese v. Rankin Fite Memo-
rial Hosp., 403 -Ala. 158, 403 So.2d 158 (1981). It should be recognized that changing a
statute of limitations may not affect outstanding claims under the construction announced by
some courts. See, e.g., Goodman v. St. Louis Children's Hosp., 687 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1985)
(en banc).
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because of the staleness of evidence. On the other hand, for the
same reason it is more difficult for plaintiffs to meet their burden of
proof. Perhaps an even more important concern is that in a period
of dynamically changing medical practice, it may be difficult to re-
construct the prevailing standard of care that existed a decade or
two earlier but is now rejected because of increased technology, new
drugs, or greater experience.
There also is concern about development of new causes of action
that raise the specter of unusually high damage awards. Prime ex-
amples are the actions described (or misdescribed) as wrongful
pregnancy and wrongful life. The former refers to an action by the
parent of a defective child based on physician negligence before the
child's birth, while the latter is an action by the child himself. Con-
siderable criticism of both actions has arisen because of what might
best be described as their ethical and philosophical underpinnings,
namely that they are based on failure to afford a parent the opportu-
nity to choose abortion over childbirth. The conceptual problem is
especially troubling in the case of an action by a child, who in es-
sence seeks damages for having been born. Despite these theoretical
difficulties, wrongful pregnancy or birth actions have been recog-
nized by courts in numerous states."0 3 Wrongful life actions are
recognized by courts in four jurisdictions."° States that have recog-
nized such actions-especially the suit for wrongful life-have
tended to sharply restrict the scope of recoverable damages, includ-
ing extraordinary medical care but excluding pain and suffering or
impairment of childhood. 105 Although highly conjectural, critics
have suggested that limiting recovery primarily to medical expenses
in effect warps the tort system by providing a mechanism for assur-
ing payment for expensive medical care that otherwise might be
either a devastating burden to parents or a charge to the state, if not
both. It is significant that the legislature of one state where a cause
of action for wrongful life was judicially recognized has adopted a
statute providing that "[n]o cause of action arises against a parent
of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been
103. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
104. See Procanik v. Ciulo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337, 643 P.2d 954 (1982); Continental Cas. Co. v. Empire Cas. Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. App.
1985).
105. The cases also indicate that recovery for these expenses can only be awarded once.
In Procanik v. Cillo, 97 NJ. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984), the court recognized that the child's
right of action was independent rather than derivative from that of the parents, whose action
had already been barred by the statute of limitations.
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conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have
been born alive."' 10 6
Another special liability problem that pediatricians may have to
face stems from the uncertainty concerning their duty or discretion
to communicate with parents of their minor patients, discussed ear-
lier in a different context" 7 The issue raised by this problem is
whether revealing such information about the child's medical treat-
ment can be used as the basis for a tort action based on breach of
the duty to maintain confidentiality.0 8 A further concern is the
issue of what standard a physician must follow in obtaining in-
formed consent from a minor whose comprehension may be limited
due to age.10 9 Because all of these problems create uncertainty,
they may have a substantial impact on insurance rates.
IV. POTENTIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN FAMILY LAW RULES
AND COST RESTRAINTS: SOME CONJECTURAL
ASSESSMENTS
Major governmental assistance for medical care is now geared
to children in the neediest families. Family law generally formu-
lates more universally applicable duties, though some of its
processes (such as those imposing criminal nonsupport sanctions)
may be used most often against parents with the least ability to pay.
Both family law support provisions and Medicaid, through their
strong but differing relationships to public assistance programs such
as AFDC, often have the greatest impact on children of broken
families. In Medicaid it is seen in terms of eligibility, while in fam-
ily law the concern is with minimizing state payments by enforcing
support obligations against absent parents.
Key family law doctrines which require parents to provide med-
ical care (especially those provisions dealing with medical neglect)
are geared toward intervention primarily in extreme cases, such as
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982). The statute further provides that "[tihe failure
or refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of his or her child shall not be a defense in any
action against a third party, nor shall the failure or refusal be considered in awarding dam-
ages in any such action."
107. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
108. For further elaboration of the nature of this duty, see Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,
287 So.2d 824 (1974). In a somewhat unusual variation, in Humphers v. Interstate Bank, 298
Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985), a physician was alleged to have written a false letter about DES
exposure to help an adopted child locate her natural mother (the plaintiff in the action). The
court held that the mother had an action for breach of confidentiality but not for invasion of
privacy.
109. See Competence to Consent, supra note 22, at 64.
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failure to provide necessary care or refusal to consent to treatment
when a child is at serious risk. Cases involving defective neonates
or children in need of an immediate procedure such as blood trans-
fusion to avoid death are good examples.
While the law now recognizes the right to recover from parents
for necessities extended to their children, the definition of "neces-
sary" medical care is not always clear. Increased recognition of the
capacity of an older child to consent to some important medical
procedures without parental concurrence has come at the possible
expense of diluting parental financial responsibility.
At a time when both government assistance and private insur-
ance coverage may be diminishing, the financial burden on parents
for children's medical care is likely to increase. Other factors, such
as the demise of historic patterns of cost shifting through the rise of
Health Maintenance Organizations and Preferred Provider Organi-
zations, may increase the financial burden for some families more
than might have been anticipated. Increased technology and spe-
cialization in the child care field, plus expanding costs from ancil-
lary areas, such as professional liability exposure, could further
compound the problem. At the same time, new and powerful sup-
port enforcement mechanisms, not necessarily adopted with medi-
cal care in mind but certainly covering it, will make it easier to
collect child support from parents through procedures such as gar-
nishment of wages, posting of security bonds, or liens against
property.
It would be helpful if basic family law rules would reinforce pro-
vision for health care needs through private sources where govern-
mental assistance is least likely. Unfortunately, the legal and
funding systems do not complement each other very well in this
manner. Neither basic preventive care needs nor the catastrophic
needs of children in families previously without significant financial
need are adequately addressed under most governmental programs.
Basic preventive care needs do not fit well in the private system
either, though private systems are now geared to ensure that the
catastrophic needs of children are met.
The picture that is drawn by these observations is not an attrac-
tive one. Just as older persons may divorce to achieve eligibility for
medical assistance, or may seek to divest themselves of assets to
qualify for assistance before the most devastating stage of
Alzheimer's disease develops, we may see parents trying to shift the
economic burden of children with exceptional medical needs by re-
linquishing parental rights or through adoption. This is not neces-
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sarily something that we can expect to witness only with the very
poor. A family that does not qualify for public assistance but has
inadequate health insurance could be hit the hardest and thus might
be most likely to react in such a manner.
Several alternatives for long term planning seem desirable,
though it is recognized that they are all politically difficult, if not
untenable at this time. Consideration should be given to some form
of "medical family allowance" that might eventually lessen the cost
of Medicaid by focusing on preventive care. Consideration also
should be given to development of a system of children's health care
that would be nearly universal in eligibility and "expandable" in its
coverage. Other measures to be considered would protect against
financial ruin from catastrophic events, or would provide transi-
tional health care coverage for young adults shortly after minority
before they have entered the labor force. Such a "bridge" approach
would be designed to reach a large population that loses parental
insurance coverage at a time when opportunities for substitute cov-
erage can be very limited.
Reorientation of private health insurance coverage so as to more
adequately focus on minors' needs might be undertaken now with
less political opposition than most of the suggestions made above.
Imaginative programs such as subsidized adoption should be
further refined, with their development emphasizing both services
to the children involved and potential cost savings. Innovative new
programs should be encouraged, but with awareness of their poten-
tial impact on families and not simply of their potential for saving
money.
Finally, current family law rules regarding children's medical
care should be carefully reevaluated and clearly restated. Such a
formulation should try to equitably balance the interests of all par-
ties involved, and should include some statement of the role that
cost concerns play in determinations of what care is appropriate
under the circumstances.
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